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SUMMARY 
How should the mental element be defined in the legal standards governing a person’s 
‘sectioning’ or placement under the Mental Health Act (MHA)? This article considers how 
this mental element is defined in many MHAs in Australasia: via a statutory list of disorders 
of mental function said to ‘characterise’ the necessary state of mind. This article assesses the 
assumptions that lie behind the adoption of this approach. It discusses the views of several 
English law reform committees that have explored how the mental element should be 
defined. It examines the philosophy of psychiatry, expounded clearly by Aubrey Lewis, that 
lies behind the Australasian approach, a philosophy that emphasises the need to identify 
mental disturbance by reference to disorders of ‘part-function of the mind’, not by reference 
to behaviour alone. It considers how the Australasian statutes address the question of 
personality disorder’s cover by the Act. In conclusion, it endorses cautiously the Australasian 
approach, principally on the ground that it may contribute positively to the conduct of review 
proceedings for compulsory patients under the Act. It may concentrate the attention of 
tribunals on particular features of the patient’s mental state, on how those features are linked 
to the associated dangers or risks, and on how the presence of those features may justify 
placing decisions about the patient’s treatment in others’ hands. Throughout, comparisons are 
made with the manner in which the mental element has been defined in mental health 
legislation for England and Wales. 
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Mental Health Acts (MHAs) regulate the civil commitment process and authorise people who 
meet their legal criteria to be placed under compulsory powers. These legal criteria usually 
have two main elements, concerning mental disorder and the necessary consequences. The 
former element designates the range of mental conditions that can qualify a person for 
compulsion. The latter specifies the necessary severity or consequences of that condition, 
usually referring to certain risks to the health or safety of that person or others, or to the need 
for hospital care. This article explains and evaluates the manner in which the mental element 
in these criteria is defined in most MHAs in Australasia, generally comparing that approach 
with the one taken in the mental health legislation for England and Wales. Reference is made 
to the views of English law reform committees that have canvassed the matter, since the 
1950s. 
 
Since the 1980s, most Australasian jurisdictions have adopted a specific approach to the 
definition of the mental element in the criteria, in conjunction with the adoption of certain 
reforms to their civil commitment process. They have constructed the definition of the mental 
element by reference to what the famous psychiatrist, Sir Aubrey Lewis, called disorders of 
‘part-function of the mind’,1 listing in the statute particular disorders of mental function of 
the kind generally used by psychiatrists to characterise mental illness. In addition, procedural 
reforms were enacted at the same time, to require the condition of compulsory patients to 
undergo more regular formal assessment, against the legal criteria, and to give patients 
greater opportunities to seek review of their status before a court or a tribunal. 
 
A. The Australasian Approach 
The Australasian approach has three main aspects.2 These concern: how the mental element 
is defined; the requirement of a link or ‘nexus’ between the mental element and the 
consequences; and the use of exclusionary rules.  
 
All the Australasian statutes to be considered here use, initially, a single headline concept to 
describe the mental element as a whole. New Zealand uses the terms ‘mental disorder’ for 
 
1 A Lewis, ‘Health as a social concept’ (1953) 4 Brit J Sociology 109, 118. 
2 I do not mean to suggest that this approach is unique to Australasia. See, for instance, the 
MHAs of Manitoba, and Nova Scotia, in Canada. 
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this purpose, while the Australian statutes use the different term ‘mental illness’. This 
difference in the headline terms makes little difference, however, because, in all these 
jurisdictions, the mental element is further defined by listing, in the statute, specific disorders 
of mental function that ‘characterise’ the necessary state of mind. This list of disorders of 
mental function is the nub of the definition.  
 
In New Zealand, for instance, to qualify for compulsion under the Act, the person’s mental 
disorder must be ‘characterised by delusions, or by disorder of mood, or perception, or 
volition or cognition’.3 In New South Wales, to meet the criterion of mental illness, the 
person must have:4 
 
A condition that seriously impairs, either temporarily or permanently, the mental 
functioning of a person and is characterised by the presence in the person of any one or 
more of the following symptoms:  
(a) delusions,  
(b) hallucinations,  
(c) serious disorder of thought form,  
(d) a severe disturbance of mood,  
(e) sustained or repeated irrational behaviour indicating the presence of any one or 
more of the symptoms referred to in paragraphs (a)-(d). 
  
In Victoria and Queensland, the person’s condition must be characterised by a ‘significant 
disturbance of thought, mood, perception or memory’.5 A similar approach is taken in 
Western Australia6 and Tasmania.7 The outcome, in all cases, is that, to be placed under 
compulsion and remain there the person must present one of the disorders of mental function 
on the statutory list. 
 
Secondly, the statutes in Australasia require a nexus to be established between the person’s 
mental condition and one of the specified consequences, in terms of dangers or risks. The 
New Zealand Act expresses this by saying the person’s state of mind must ‘pose’ one of 
 
3 Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 (NZ), s 2. 
4 Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW), s 4. 
5 Mental Health Act 2014 (Victoria), s 4(1); Mental Health Act 2016 (Queensland), s 10(1). 
6 Mental Health Act 2014 (WA), s 6. 
7 Mental Health Act 2013 (Tas), s 4. 
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those consequences.8 Tasmania uses the formulation that ‘without treatment, the mental 
illness will … seriously harm’ the relevant interests of the person or others,9 meaning the 
illness must produce the harm. In Victoria,10 Queensland,11 Western Australia,12 and New 
South Wales,13 the consequences must arise ‘because of’, or ‘owing to’, the illness. 
 
Thirdly, these Australasian jurisdictions employ certain exclusionary rules that say a person 
is not to be civilly committed ‘by reason only of’ certain factors, which generally include 
substance abuse, criminal or antisocial behaviour, and intellectual disability. These 
exclusionary rules do not say explicitly that a person cannot be considered mentally 
disordered, in the relevant sense, ‘by reason only of’ a listed factor. So these rules are not 
directly part of the definition of mental disorder, and, if a person presenting one of the 
excluded factors also presents a disorder of mental function on the list, they can be placed 
under compulsion. Nevertheless, the exclusionary rules make it clear that certain factors – 
including criminal or antisocial behaviour – cannot alone justify a person’s placement under 
the MHA.  
 
Intellectual disability is one of the excluded factors. This is because, in Australasia, the 
control (if at all required) of people with such a disability is handled under separate 
legislation, particularly adult guardianship (or incapacity) legislation.14 It is not therefore 
covered by the MHA.15 
 
B. The Assumptions to be Examined 
This article examines certain assumptions that seem to lie behind this Australasian approach. 
Four assumptions seem paramount. First, adopting this approach surely assumes there is 
 
8 MHA (NZ), s 2. 
9 MHA (Tasmania), s 40(b). 
10 MHA (Victoria), s 5. 
11 MHA (Queensland), s 12(1)(c). 
12 MHA (WA), s 25(1)(b). 
13 MHA (NSW), s 4. 
14 For example, in New Zealand, such matters are handled under either the adult guardianship 
(or incapacity) legislation, the Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 (NZ) or 
under special legislation governing criminal procedure and dispositions from the trial 
process: the Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003 (NZ) and the 
Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003 (NZ). 
15 Although a person said to have both a mental illness and an intellectual disability could 
still be covered. 
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value in trying to provide a specific definition of the mental element in the civil commitment 
standards, and especially value in trying to give content to the notion of mental illness, rather 
than leaving that notion undefined. Secondly, it seems to assume that the best way to give the 
mental element a specific definition is to list discrete disorders of mental function in the 
statute. This is in contrast with listing broad diagnostic categories (such as mental illness, 
mental handicap, and psychopathic disorder), of the kind used in the MHA 1959 and 1983 
(UK) (as originally enacted). Thirdly, there is the assumption that this approach to the 
identification of mental disorder, based on disorders of specific mental functions, in addition 
to being widely used in the practice of psychiatry, can be used successfully in a MHA. To be 
successful in this regard, it would probably need to produce a statement of the mental 
element that is not excessively controversial, especially among psychiatrists; does not present 
intractable problems of interpretation; and will contribute positively to the operation of the 
review procedures for compulsory patients that are also established by the Act. Fourthly, 
there seems to be the assumption that this approach can handle (or finesse) satisfactorily the 
difficult question of whether the definition of mental disorder should cover ‘psychopathic’ or 
‘personality’ disorder.  
 
This article examines these assumptions and considers the background and merits of this 
Australasian approach.  
 
II. WHY PROVIDE A SPECIFIC DEFINITION OF MENTAL DISORDER IN A MHA 
Many MHAs make no attempt to provide a comprehensive definition of the mental element 
in their civil commitment standards. In particular, no definition may be provided of the 
critical term ‘mental illness’, although that general term would probably cover to the 
condition of most people placed under compulsory powers. The statutes in Australasia, in 
contrast, purport to define comprehensively the mental element, by listing in the Act the 
specific disorders of mental function by which the person’s mental condition must be 
‘characterised’. What are the potential advantages of this approach?  
One advantage may be to advance certain principles (or values) that are associated with the 
rule of law and with the right of all persons not to be arbitrarily detained. One such principle 
concerns the need for all forms of detention (and any other significant deprivation of rights) 
to be governed by a discernible rule, established by law. A second principle concerns the 
need for the rules governing detention to be expressed in a way that assists courts or tribunals 
 6 
to review rigorously their application, in individual cases, to ensure all elements of the legal 
standards are met. These principles are embedded, for instance, in Article 9(1) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.16 
Generally, human rights principles support the view that the legal standards governing 
detention must be sufficiently knowable, or predictable,17 in advance. The standards should 
permit detention decisions to be sufficiently consistent or reliable. They should not license 
excessive discretion at the point of application.18 And they should permit a judicial (or quasi-
judicial) body, reviewing the decision, to determine whether a person has been correctly 
detained. The New Zealand Court of Appeal sums this up by saying ‘detention is arbitrary … 
if it is made without an adequate determining principle’.19  
 
People can be detained for long periods in secure conditions under a MHA and face 
significant limits on other rights, including freedom of association, freedom of movement, 
contact with family, and personal privacy. So, is an adequate determining principle for their 
detention set by law if the MHA provides no specific definition of the mental element – or 
critical aspects of it – in the governing criteria?  
 
The MHA 1983 (UK) can be considered in this light. As originally enacted, it defined the 
element of ‘mental disorder’ by reference to four broad diagnostic categories: mental illness, 
mental handicap, severe mental handicap, and psychopathic disorder.20 Nevertheless, like 
many other MHAs, it provided no further definition of the category of mental illness. 
Moreover, since that Act’s amendment in 2007, it defines ‘mental disorder’ even more 
broadly, as ‘any disorder or disability of the mind’.21 The Mental Health Act Code of Practice 
for England and Wales says application of this standard is to be determined ‘in accordance 
with good clinical practice and accepted standards’.22 Bartlett and Sandland say the 
 
16 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, 999 UNTS 171, entered into 
force 23 March 1976. 
17 In Zaoui v Attorney-General [2005] 1 NZLR 577 (CA), at [86], for example, McGrath J 
said that one of the ‘touchstones for arbitrariness’ is ‘lack of predictability’. 
18 R v Hufsky (1988) 1 SCR 621 (SCC); R v Ladouceur [1990] 1 SCR 1257 (SCC); Anderson 
v Scottish Ministers [2001] 3 WLR 1469 (PC). 
19 Neilsen v Attorney-General [2001] 3 NZLR 433 (CA), at [34]. 
20 MHA 1983, s 1(2). 
21 MHA 1983, s 1(2) (as amended by Mental Health Act 2007). 
22 Department of Health, Code of Practice: Mental Health Act 1983 (Department of Health: 
London, 2015) para. 3.2. 
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‘diagnostic threshold’ in the Act is ‘to be determined according to medical criteria’.23 Jones 
says the broad definition in the current English legislation ‘provides clinicians with a very 
wide discretion in identifying which conditions come within its scope’.24  
 
So, does this English approach provide a sufficient determining principle that avoids 
licensing arbitrary detention? Perhaps it does. In addition to the criteria of mental disorder, 
further legal criteria have to be met, of course, for a person to be ‘sectioned’ or confined 
under the Act. The person’s mental disorder must be of such a degree that it warrants 
detention in a hospital; the person’s confinement must be necessary to protect someone’s 
health or safety; ‘appropriate treatment’ must be ‘available’; and so on.25 In conjunction with 
the need to satisfy such additional standards, perhaps a broad definition of mental disorder 
will suffice. No court or international tribunal has ruled otherwise, as far as I am aware. 
 
The leading decision on the matter is Winterwerp v The Netherlands.26 There the European 
Court of Human Rights laid down certain requirements for a person’s lawful detention for 
mental health purposes. The person’s mental disorder (or unsoundness of mind) must be 
‘reliably’ identified, via an exercise of ‘objective medical expertise’, and it must be of such a 
‘kind and degree’ as to warrant the person’s compulsory confinement.27 Nevertheless, 
Winterwerp does not establish that the detailed criteria of mental disorder, to be used in that 
assessment, must be laid down in a statute in advance. It suggests only that the criteria must 
be discernible to those with the necessary expertise. The decision of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Hufksy is to similar effect.28 It declared it was sufficient – to avoid ‘arbitrariness’ – 
for the criteria governing a person’s detention to be determinable via implication, from the 
context or the purposes of the power. It may not therefore be necessary for the detailed 
criteria governing a person’s detention under a MHA to be explicit on the face of the statute, 
provided they are discernible to those with ‘objective medical expertise’. 
 
 
23 P Bartlett and R Sandland, Mental Health Law: Policy and Practice (Oxford University 
Press: Oxford, 4th edn, 2014) 14. 
24 R Jones, Mental Health Act Manual (Sweet and Maxwell: London, 17th edn, 2014), para 1–
027. 
25 MHA 1983 (UK), s 3(2). 
26 Winterwerp v The Netherlands [1979] ECHR 4, [1979] 2 EHRR 387. 
27 Ibid, para 39. 
28 R v Hufsky (1988) 1 SCR 621 (SCC). 
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There is still the question of best practice. Is it enough that the detailed criteria of mental 
disorder should be discernible to doctors using professional expertise? Or would it be better 
for the detailed criteria upon which detention hinges to be more accessible – more knowable 
and publicly available, if possible – and accessible to a wider range of participants in the civil 
commitment process?  
 
Undoubtedly doctors (and particularly psychiatrists) play a critical role in this process. They 
must directly apply the legal criteria to patients before them, when making decisions about 
patients’ ‘sectioning’, and about their immediate release from compulsion, and often 
psychiatrists make such decisions before the patient goes anywhere near a court or a tribunal. 
Psychiatrists are therefore primary decision-makers under the Act, and no doubt Parliament 
conferred such functions on them due to their special expertise. Nevertheless, can a definition 
of mental disorder be found that is discernible both to psychiatrists and to a wider range of 
participants in the process?  
 
The tribunals and courts, in particular, that are charged with conducting the review 
procedures for compulsory patients, are – obviously – not composed solely of psychiatrists. 
Lawyers (and often lay members) sit on tribunals, and judges adjudicate the matter in the 
courts, when it comes before them. How could these other decision-makers, who are not 
psychiatrists but have concurrent powers to release patients from compulsion, adequately 
scrutinise the application of the legal standards in difficult, contested cases if the meaning of 
a critical element in the standards was left to members of the psychiatric profession? 
 
A. Reliance on the Diagnostic Criteria Used by Psychiatrists 
Psychiatrists can, of course, obtain guidance from their well-developed systems of diagnostic 
nomenclature, and the MHA in turn could define mental disorder by reference to those 
diagnostic systems. It might say: ‘In this Act, “mental disorder” means all conditions listed in 
the formal diagnostic manuals of the psychiatric profession’.  
 
There would still be problems with that approach. First, psychiatrists in the English-speaking 
world use two major, competing diagnostic systems: the DSM system of the American 
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Psychiatric Association29 (APA), and the ICD system of the World Health Organisation 
(WHO).30 Both are lengthy and complex, significant differences exist between them, and 
neither is formulated for the purposes of authorising compulsory treatment. They are 
formulated mainly for the purpose of assisting psychiatrists in assessment, treatment, 
research, billing, and estimating the prevalence of various forms of mental disorder in the 
population, regardless of whether the patients concerned are voluntary or involuntary. They 
cover many forms of mental disorder, of varying degrees of severity. Some of these would 
not usually be an appropriate focus of compulsory treatment, such as those concerning 
anxiety, substance use, sexual and gender identity, the milder forms of depression, and so on. 
Some selection of diagnoses would need to be made, for civil commitment purposes, and on 
this matter experienced psychiatrists could disagree. Nevertheless, the MHA deliberately 
places psychiatrists at the centre of decisions about the use of compulsion, and they are 
bound, in performing their functions, to draw on their disciplinary expertise.  
 
B. The Arguments Against a Definition Traversed by the English Law Reform Committees 
Government-appointed committees (or commissions) reviewing English mental health law 
have, on occasion, debated the idea of inserting a comprehensive definition of mental 
disorder into the MHA, including a definition of mental illness. In the end, they have 
generally rejected that idea, for many reasons. In particular, they have considered that 
drafting a precise, ‘economical’ definition of the concept of mental illness, for these 
purposes, was not an easy task.31 Such a definition would have to encompass a great variety 
of mental conditions. Many of these conditions could not be defined by reference to cause, as 
their cause is contested or unknown. In particular, any formulation of mental illness might 
soon become outmoded, and there are dangers in casting a legal definition in terms alien to 
psychiatry.  
 
So, writing in 1975, the Butler Committee said of the approach taken in the 1959 Act that: 
‘No definition of the term “mental illness” was attempted or was possible for the writers of 
the Act, since … mental illness is a large group of dissimilar disorders and no comprehensive 
 
29 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (American 
Psychiatric Association: Arlington, Virginia, 2013) (known as DSM-5). 
30 ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders (World Health Organisation: 
Geneva, 1993). 
31 Report of the Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders (Cmnd. 6244, HMSO: London, 
1975), para 18.34. 
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short definition is possible’.32 Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights, in 
Winterwerp, said of the notion of an ‘unsound mind’, this it is:33 
 
not one that can be given a definitive interpretation … [because] it is a term whose 
meaning is constantly evolving as research in psychiatry progresses … [although it] 
obviously cannot be taken as permitting the detention of a person simply because his 
views or behaviour deviate from the norms prevailing in a particular society. 
 
The Expert Committee reviewing the 1983 Act also warned, in 1999, of the ‘danger of 
entrenching in legislation a definition which might quickly become outdated as clinical 
practice develops’.34 In short, any closed statutory definition of mental disorder might not 
‘stand the test of time’.35 In addition, the English committees have expressed concern that 
any statutory definition might be drawn too widely, thus appearing – controversially – to 
bring new categories of patient within the scope of compulsion.36 Alternatively, they were 
concerned the definition might be too narrow, excluding patients in urgent need of protection 
or control.37  
 
The Percy Commission considered the absence of a definition of mental illness in the Act had 
not presented particular problems. The scope of the concept had been satisfactorily ‘confined 
by medical tradition to a distinct range of medical conditions for over 100 years’,38 and 




32 Ibid, para 5.24.  
33 Winterwerp v The Netherlands [1979] ECHR 4, [1979] 2 EHRR 387, para 37. 
34 Report of the Expert Committee: Review of the Mental Health Act 1983 (Department of 
Health, London, 1999), para 4.4. 
35 Department of Health and Social Security, A Review of the Mental Health Act 1959 
(HMSO: London, 1976), para 1.17. 
36 Ibid, para 1.12; Report of the Expert Committee: Review of the Mental Health Act 1983 
(Department of Health, London, 1999), para 4.4. 
37 Report of the Expert Committee: Review of the Mental Health Act 1983 (Department of 
Health, London, 1999), para 4.4; Department of Health and Social Security, A Review of the 
Mental Health Act 1959 (HMSO: London, 1976), para 1.13. 
38 Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency 1954-
1957 (Cmnd. 169, HMSO: London, 1957), para 324. 
39 Ibid, para 325. 
40 Ibid, para 357. 
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It is far preferable that, in referring to the various forms of mental disorder, the law 
should use general terms which will convey a sufficiently clear meaning to the medical 
profession without trying to describe medical conditions in detail in semi-medical 
language. 
 
C. The English Committees’ Recommendations for a Definition of Mental Illness  
Despite these concerns, two English law reform committees, in the 1970s, proceeded to 
formulate and publish a comprehensive definition of mental illness that they considered 
suitable for inclusion in the law. 
 
1. The Proposals of the Butler Committee 
The Butler Committee on Mental Abnormal Offenders made the initial proposal. It 
recommended that a statutory definition of ‘severe mental illness’41 should be adopted for the 
purposes of the criminal law. It should be adopted, the committee thought, into a revised 
insanity defence, replacing the ‘disease of the mind’ element in the M’Naghten rules.42 The 
courts had already given that element of the defence a narrow interpretation, limiting it to 
severe mental illness. So ‘psychopathic’ or ‘severe personality’ disorder had already been 
excluded as a foundation for the defence. Thus, any reformulation need cover only the 
concept of severe mental illness, and that concept was capable of ‘comprehensive’ and 
‘economical’ definition: by listing in the statute specific disorders of mental function.43 
 
The Committee thought this new definition should meet certain requirements. Above all, it 
should ‘avoid the use of medical terms about which there may be disputed interpretations or 
whose meanings may change with the years’.44 It should therefore describe the symptoms of 
severe mental illness by reference to basic concepts in long-term use in psychiatry, notably 
by reference to the particular disorders of mental function usually distinguished by 
psychiatrists. Then, in their reports and testimony to criminal courts, psychiatrists could relate 
the facts of the defendant’s mental condition to those basic psychiatric concepts without 
pronouncing on the ultimate issue before the court – the defendant’s responsibility for the 
crime. That matter of responsibility was a legal, not a medical matter. It should be determined 
 
41 Ibid, para 18.31-18.36. 
42 Idem. 
43 Idem. 
44 Ibid, para 18.17. 
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by judge and jury.45 In contrast, the task of a psychiatrist assessing a defendant pleading 
insanity would be to explain to the judge and jury how certain disorders of mental function 
were disturbed (or not) in the defendant at the relevant time. 
 
For this purpose, the Committee favoured the following definition of ‘severe mental 
illness’:46 
 
A mental illness is severe when it has one or more of the following characteristics:– 
(a) Lasting impairment of intellectual functions shown by failure of memory, 
orientation, comprehension and learning capacity; 
(b) Lasting alteration of mood … 
(c) Delusional beliefs … 
(d) Abnormal perceptions … 
(e) Thinking so disordered as to prevent reasonable appraisal of the patient’s situation 
or reasonable communication with others. 
 
Here mental illness is defined through a list of disorders of mental function of the kind used 
as chapter headings in classical psychiatric texts on clinical psychopathology.47 The 
Committee thought the disorders listed should characterise the so-called ‘psychotic’ 
conditions, because these were linked to impaired insight, impaired understanding, and 
reduced responsibility for conduct, on the part of the defendant.48 Their presence could 
therefore justify the defendant’s reliance on the insanity defence, and the usual outcome of 
that defence: disposition to the mental health system, for compulsory treatment.  
 
2. The DHSS Committee’s Discussion of a Definition for the Purposes of the MHA 
Subsequently, in 1976, the year after the Butler Committee published its report, a committee 
appointed by the Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) to review the MHA for 
 
45 Ibid, para 18.36. 
46 Ibid, para 18.35. 
47 Such as K Jaspers, General Psychopathology (J Hoenig and M Hamilton trans., 
Manchester University Press: Manchester, 1963); and Fish’s Clinical Psychopathology, P 
Casey, B Kelly (eds) (Gaskell: London, 3rd edn, 2007). The latter text, used by generations of 
trainee psychiatrists, uses the chapter headings: disorders of perception; thought and speech; 
memory; emotion (or mood); experience of the self; consciousness; and movement. 
48 Report of the Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders (Cmnd. 6244, HMSO: London, 
1975), para 18.33. 
 13 
England and Wales picked up these ideas and applied them to civil commitment.49  This 
committee considered the main advantages of using a ‘closed’ (as opposed to an open-ended) 
definition of a general term like ‘mental disorder’ in a MHA was to give the term some 
definitive content.  
 
The committee considered the MHA for England and Wales should continue use the headline 
term mental disorder, and that term should still be defined by reference to four sub-
categories: those of mental illness, severe mental subnormality, severe personality disorder, 
and severe behaviour reaction.50 To ensure the concept of mental disorder was ‘closed’, all 
four of those sub-categories – including mental illness – should receive specific definition, 
and, for that purpose, the Butler Committee’s approach to the definition of severe mental 
illness could be used.  
 
Baroness Hale adds, in her text on mental health law that the aim of this approach was to list 
in the statute “those symptoms which might be thought to invalidate the patient’s own 
decision-making”,51 justifying transfer of authority over their treatment to others. In other 
words, it was intended that the relevant symptoms would be associated with lack of capacity 
to make treatment decisions, and listing those symptoms in the statute would establish an 
implicit incapacity test.52   
 
The Committee thought ‘fully comprehensive and precise definitions’ would be valuable 
because this ‘would render decisions’ about the use of compulsory powers ‘more susceptible 
to critical examination and arbitration’.53 To this end, ‘mental illness should be closely 
defined in terms which are readily understood by clinicians and which would enable close 
 
49 Department of Health and Social Security, A Review of the Mental Health Act 1959 
(HMSO: London, 1976). 
50 Ibid, Appendix II. 
51 B Hoggett (now Baroness Hale) Mental Health Law (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 5th edn, 
2010) 45. 
52 It would of course be possible to add an explicit incapacity test. Queensland has recently 
done this. In addition to defining ‘mental illness’ in terms of disorders of specific mental 
functions, its MHA requires that ‘the person does not have capacity to consent to be treated 
for the illness”: MHA 2016 (Queensland), s 12(1)(b). 
53 Department of Health and Social Security, A Review of the Mental Health Act 1959 
(HMSO: London, 1976), para 1.15. 
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monitoring and debate on individual decisions in contrast to the present arrangement whereby 
“mental illness” is not defined’.54 
 
Thus, by the mid-1970s, English law reform committees had proposed a specific definition of 
‘mental illness’, based on listed disorders of mental function (or specific forms of 
psychopathology), for use on both the criminal and the civil sides of mental health law. Such 
a definition could ‘close’ the formulation used in the law. These committees were making 
these proposals in the era in which the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
was coming into force, prohibiting ‘arbitrary’ detention and promising all detained persons a 
right to independent review.55 It was the era in which the ‘anti-psychiatry’ movement was at 
its peak.56 There was deep concern about the political abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet 
Union,57 and generally a sharp focus on the need to prevent the arbitrary use of state power 
under the guise of mental health law.  
 
III. AUBREY LEWIS AND THE ‘DISORDERS OF MENTAL FUNCTION’ APPROACH 
What, then, is the intellectual background to this ‘disorders of mental function’ approach to 
the definition of ‘mental illness’ that the English law reform committees favoured for 
inclusion in the law? The pre-eminent, short explanation of it is probably that provided by Sir 
Aubrey Lewis (1900-75), the professor of psychiatry at the Institute of Psychiatry in London, 
from 1946 to 1966.  
 
Lewis is described in one work of medical history as ‘the most influential post-war 
psychiatrist in the UK’.58 Through his teaching at the Institute, and a series of essays 
 
54 Ibid Appendix II.  
55 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, 999 UNTS 171, entered into 
force 23 March 1976, Art 9. 
56 Following publication of such books as T Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness (Harper and 
Row: New York, 1961); R Laing and A Esterson, Sanity, Madness and the Family (Penguin 
Books: London, 1964); D Cooper (ed), Psychiatry and Anti-Psychiatry (Paladin: London, 
1967). 
57 P Reddaway and S Bloch, Russia's Political Hospitals: The Abuse of Psychiatry in the 
Soviet Union (Victor Gollancz:  London, 1977); J Wing, Reasoning About Madness (Oxford 
University Press, 1978). 
58 K Angel, E Jones, M Neve (eds), European Psychiatry on the Eve of War: Aubrey Lewis, 
the Maudsley Hospital and the Rockefeller Foundation in the 1930s (Welcome Trust: 
London, 2003) 3. 
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published in the 1950s and 60s,59 Lewis’s intellectual influence was probably at its peak in 
the 1970s, when the Butler and DHSS Committees were reporting. Moreover, it may be no 
coincidence to our story that Lewis was originally an Australian, born and schooled in 
Adelaide, and that many doctors who subsequently practised psychiatry in Australasia were 
trained at the Institute, in London, during Lewis’s time. 
 
In two well-known essays, “Health as a social concept” (1953),60 and ‘Medicine and the 
affections of the mind’ (1963),61 Lewis drew on the well-established psychiatric discipline of 
clinical psychopathology to state his views on the approach that psychiatrists should take to 
the identification of mental illness. He argued that “the criteria of health [and ill health] are 
not primarily social”, but should be based on the ‘integrity of particular physiological and 
psychological functions’.62 Mental illness was therefore best defined in terms of ‘evident 
disturbance of part-functions” of the mind, ‘not in terms of disturbed social functioning 
alone’.63 So he wrote:64 
 
For illness to be inferred disorder of function must be detectable at a discrete or 
differentiated level …  If non-conformity can be detected only in total behaviour, while 
all the particular psychological functions seem unimpaired, health will be presumed, 
not illness. 
 
Lewis conceded that mental ‘functions are an artificial construct’,65 but it was still ‘possible 
to classify the phenomena of mental illness in terms of disordered function’.66 Disturbance of 
particular functions of the mind was shown in discrete forms of psychopathology:67 
 
by the occurrence of, say, disturbed thinking as in delusions, or disturbed perceptions, 
as in hallucinations, or disturbed emotional state, as in anxiety neurosis or 
 
59 These essays, originally published in journals, are collected in two volumes: A Lewis, The 
State of Psychiatry, (Routledge & Kegan Paul: London, 1967); A Lewis, Inquiries in 
Psychiatry: Clinical and Social Investigations (Routledge & Kegan Paul: London, 1967). 
60 A Lewis, ‘Health as a social concept’ (1953) 4 Brit J Sociology 109. 
61 A Lewis, ‘Mental illness and the affections of the mind’ (1963) BMJ 1549. 
62 Ibid, 1550. 






melancholia… Deviant, maladapted, non-conformist behaviour is pathological if [and 
only if] it is accompanied by a manifest disturbance of some such functions. 
 
Careful examination of the patient’s mental state, especially via the clinical interview, was 
designed to elucidate these disturbances in mental function – a technique carefully elaborated 
by Lewis and colleagues at the Maudsley Hospital in London, that has since become standard 
psychiatric practice.68 
 
As to the particular mental functions in which disturbance could be observed, Lewis wrote: 
“There is, at present, general agreement about the importance of the following: – perception, 
learning, thinking, remembering, feeling, emotion, motivation”.69 But this “list of functions is 
provisional”, and “The main objection may be that the list is not exhaustive”.70  
“Motivation”, he thought, “is the least satisfying and probably the most important”,71 and 
“The crucial difficulty arises with psychopathic personality”.72 Of this he said:73 “until the 
category is further defined and shown to be characterized by specific abnormality of 
psychological functions, it will not be possible to consider those who fall within it to be 
unhealthy, however deviant their social behaviour”.  So, managing such persons on behalf of 
society was not a proper function of psychiatry.74 Instead, ‘the practice of psychiatry should 
be limited to illness and its prevention, and that illness occurs broadly when there is disabling 
or distressing interference with normal function’ (of the mind).75 
 
Thus, in his influential writing and teaching at the Institute, Lewis took the firm view that, in 
psychiatry, the careful assessment and description of disturbance of particular mental 
functions was central to the identification of illness, in the same way that careful assessment 
of disturbance in part-functions of the body was central to the practice of physical medicine. 
Danger to self or others, on the other hand, was a contingent, not a necessary, feature of 
mental illness. It was not therefore the defining characteristic. Classifying disturbance by 
 
68 G Owen, S Wessely, R Murray, The Maudsley Handbook of Practical Psychiatry (Oxford 




72 A Lewis, ‘Health as a social concept’ (1953) 4 Brit J Sociology 109, 119. 
73 Idem. 
74 A Lewis, ‘Mental illness and the affections of the mind’ (1963) BMJ 1549, 1550. 
75 Idem, 1550. 
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reference to part-functions of the mind was the way to distinguish the mentally ill from the 
merely socially deviant, and the way to reduce the risk of political or social abuse of 
psychiatry. Any list of particular disorders of mental function was bound to be provisional, 
however, and would be controversial at the margins. Disorders of motivation (or volition, or 
will) were important, but problematic. Plus it would be difficult to characterise those with 
personality disorders in terms of disorders on the list. Nevertheless, there was no better way 
to distinguish mental illness from socially unacceptable behaviour. Thus Lewis expressed the 
hope that, if psychiatrists were asked to act “as the agents of organized society in getting 
“deviants” to conform, …  with “psychopathic disorder” as the thin end of the wedge, … they 
will refuse”.76 
 
Lewis did not intend these thoughts on identifying mental illness to be a full account of the 
process of psychiatric diagnosis. Determining that a person is experiencing certain disorders 
of mental function plays an important role in formulating a diagnosis, but would not be 
viewed by psychiatrists as sufficient, particularly because many disorders of mental function 
– say, delusions, or highly elevated mood – pertain to many different psychiatric diagnoses 
that need to be distinguished. To form a diagnosis, further information will usually be 
required: about the duration and history of the person’s condition, any causal or precipitating 
factors, patterns of illness in their family, and so on. But this additional information will not 
necessarily be available at the time a person is ‘sectioned’ under the Act.  
 
As Kendell explains, a psychiatric diagnosis is not reached by identifying individual 
symptoms, or particular disorders of mental function alone. Instead, it is reached by 
identifying syndromes, or ‘clusters of signs and symptoms with a characteristic time 
course’.77 Nevertheless, the process of reaching a diagnosis relies on the identification of 
particular disorders of mental function, which are grouped together into such syndromes. 
Thus, the notion of disorders of particular mental functions is fundamental and familiar to 
psychiatrists. 
 
IV. INCLUSION OF PSYCHOPATHIC OR PERSONALITY DISORDER 
 
76 Idem, 1553. 
77 R Kendell, The Role of Diagnosis in Psychiatry (Blackwell Scientific Publications: Oxford, 
1975) 21. 
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Lewis therefore took a particular view on whether psychiatrists should consider psychopathic 
(or personality) disorder to be a mental illness: he considered it not easily classifiable in 
terms of disorder of mental function. Moreover, if psychiatrists appeared to assume 
responsibility for its treatment, they risked being viewed as agents of social control: that is, as 
controlling, on behalf of society, a condition characterised primarily by deviant or 
maladaptive behaviour, not disordered mental function. This in turn risked confusing their 
role with that of other social mechanisms designed to control such behaviour, notably the 
criminal justice system.  
 
Lewis therefore draws our attention to certain central themes in the debate about whether 
those said to have a personality disorder but not a mental illness should be controllable under 
a MHA. Nevertheless, under Lewis’s approach, a person would not be ruled in or out as a 
candidate for psychiatric attention by reference to such a universal term as personality 
disorder or mental illness.78 The question for Lewis was not whether a person could be fit 
within such a universal term. It was whether particular aspects of their mental state, carefully 
assessed, constituted a recognised disorder of ‘part-function of the mind’.  
 
So, should personality disorder be covered by a MHA? In England, from 1913, the category 
of ‘moral imbecile’ had been included within the definition of the mental element in the 
standards for compulsion.79 That term was then replaced by ‘psychopathic disorder’ in 1959, 
the term used again in 1983. As a result, the English law reform committees reviewing the 
Act had to consider whether this condition should continue to be covered. The fact that this 
concept was already included meant, however, that these committees had to consider the 
matter in a particular context. They had to consider what was to be done with patients already 
detained on the basis of psychopathic disorder, many in secure or special hospitals, if this 
condition was removed from cover by the Act. As the Butler Committee put it in 1975: ‘it is 
one thing to have an Act of Parliament which has never included the term [psychopathic 
disorder], but another to withdraw it after it has been in a statute for 16 years’.80  
 
 
78 It is said that, to Lewis, ‘the reification of [such] universals was like a red flag to a bull’: 
Angel at al above at 38. 
79 Mental Deficiency Act 1913 (UK). 
80 Report of the Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders (Cmnd. 6244, HMSO: London, 
1975), para 5.24. 
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The Australasian jurisdictions were not in this position when they reviewed their MHAs in 
the 1980s and 90s. Generally, their MHAs had not previously referred to psychopathic or 
personality disorder in the definition. This changed fundamentally the context in which the 
matter fell to be considered.  
 
Even so, the question arises: should personality disorder be covered? Much can be said on 
both sides of that proposition. Those opposed to its inclusion have many concerns. They may 
doubt the usefulness of the whole concept of personality disorder, especially its reliability in 
application. More particularly, like Lewis, they may doubt whether personality disorders can 
be characterised in terms of disorders of mental function.81 As the Percy Commission put it, 
‘The difficulty is that what distinguishes psychopathic patients from ordinary citizens is their 
general behaviour, not loss of reason or serious lack of intelligence’.82 Thus, subjecting such 
patients to preventive detention in hospitals ‘almost amounts to the creation of new criminal 
offences’.83 Opponents of inclusion of personality disorder will point to the lack of evidence 
concerning the efficacy of treatment, especially treatment under compulsion. They will point 
to adverse effects of such patients’ behaviour on the therapeutic milieu of the hospital, 
affecting other patients, and they will point to the absence of any clear dividing line between 
people given this designation and those sent to prison.  
 
On the other side, those who favour inclusion of personality disorder within the definition are 
generally concerned not to close off the possibility of using the MHA, for some people, given 
that designation, in some situations. In particular, they think it should not be foreclosed, in an 
emergency, when a person poses an imminent threat of self-harm, or when the person’s 
disorder is particularly severe and poses a very serious threat of harm to other people, 
especially identifiable victims. On this view, some people whose personality disorder has 
particular qualities should be amenable to preventive control, under the MHA, on some 
occasions. We should not succumb to nihilism about the prospects of treatment, or abandon 
such people entirely to imprisonment. Diversion to the mental health system should remain a 
possibility, providing a safety valve for the police, courts, and prison service. As Paul Mullen 
puts it, it is not enough simply to say that people with personality disorder ‘lack the type of 
 
81 R Kendell, ‘The distinction between personality disorder and mental illness’ (2002) 180 B 
J Psych 110. 
82 Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency 1954-
1957 (Cmnd. 169, HMSO: London, 1957), para 339. 
83 Ibid, para 338. 
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disturbance in mental state which we have learnt are the signs of true mental disorder’, when 
we ‘are dealing with a spectrum of behavioural and psychological problems with no ‘natural’ 
divisions’.84 
 
A plausible conclusion to this debate, therefore, akin to that reached in both the Percy and the 
Butler reports, is that compulsory admission under the MHA of people said to have a severe 
personality disorder should be not be impossible. Nevertheless, it should be available in 
limited circumstances only, usually in emergencies and for short periods. In particular, 
observation and assessment should be available, to permit more information to be gathered 
about a person’s mental state. On the other hand, the usual view is that the MHA should not 
generally be used authorise the pure preventive detention of people considered ‘dangerous’ 
but untreatable. Instead, the focus of the Act should be on those most likely to benefit from 
treatment. The admission of people said to have a personality disorder but not a mental 
illness should always require the hospital’s consent, and the law should clearly establish the 
responsibility of the prison service for receiving and managing ‘dangerous’ people with 
personality disorders who have been convicted of an offence. 
 
The Australasian approach is largely compatible with these conclusions. It defines the mental 
element in terms largely characteristic of mental illness, not personality disorder. Then it adds 
exclusionary rules that warn against placing people under compulsion ‘by reason only of’ 
anti-social or maladaptive behaviour.  Nevertheless, it does not define the mental element in a 
manner that includes or excludes personality disorder per se. Nor is personality disorder one 
of the factors listed in the exclusionary rules. The central question under the Australasian 
approach is simply whether an individual’s mental state constitutes a disorder of mental 
function on the statutory list. No special rules apply to those said to have a personality 
disorder.  
 
The general effect of this is to make it difficult but not impossible for a person said to have a 
personality disorder but not a mental illness to meet the criteria for compulsion, for other than 
a short period of time. It is difficult because, except during brief periods of crisis, such a 
person will not generally be considered to present one of the necessary disorders of mental 
function, because those disorders are mainly characteristic of the so-called ‘psychoses’, not 
 
84 P Mullen, ‘Psychopathy: a developmental disorder of ethical action’ (1992) 2 CBMH 234, 
235-236. 
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personality disorder. In addition, it will be difficult if the apparent need for the person’s 
compulsion is closely related to a factor listed in the exclusionary rules, such as illegal or 
antisocial conduct. A person given a diagnosis of personality disorder can still be placed 
under the Act, however, if their mental state can be convincingly described in terms on the 
list. The outcome is to put considerable pressure on the contents of that list, and on its proper 
interpretation. 
 
V. THE CONTENT AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LISTS OF DISORDERS OF MENTAL FUNCTION 
The following Table shows the terms used in the lists of disorders of mental function in the 
current MHAs of New Zealand and five Australian states:85  
 
Table 1 here 
 
As can be seen, there is considerable overlap in the content of these lists, and in the language 
employed. Very similar terms are employed in Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia, and 
Tasmania, requiring a ‘condition characterised by a clinically significant disturbance of 
thought, mood, perception, or memory’.86 Consistent reference is made, across the 
jurisdictions, to serious disorders of (or disturbance in) ‘thought’, ‘mood’ and ‘perception’.  
 
There is also some variation in the contents of these lists. New Zealand makes no reference to 
disorder of ‘thought’, though ‘delusions’ and disorder of ‘cognition’ are covered, addressing 
very similar terrain. New South Wales lists both disorders of ‘thought form’ and ‘delusions’. 
Victoria, Queensland, and Western Australia list disorders of ‘memory’, while that concept 
has to be brought under ‘thought’ or ‘cognition’ in the other jurisdictions. ‘Volition’ is listed 
in New Zealand, Western Australia and Tasmania, but not in Victoria, Queensland or New 
South Wales.  
 
The definition of mental illness in the New South Wales legislation may be the purest 
example of Lewis’s approach. It uses the specific term ‘hallucinations’, rather than the 
broader ‘disorders of perception’. It talks of disorder of ‘thought form’ and ‘delusions’, rather 
than disorder of ‘thought’ in general (‘delusions’ presumably covering disorder of thought 
 
85 Among the Australian States, South Australia is the exception; it does not use this 
approach. 
86 As it is put in the Mental Health Act 2016 (Queensland), s 10(1). 
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content, to the extent allowed). It covers only ‘severe’ disturbances of mood; and there is no 
reference to ‘volition’.87 
 
Generally, the content of these lists was settled when the Australasian jurisdictions reformed 
their mental health laws in the 1980s and 90s, at the same time as they enhanced the review 
entitlements of compulsory patients, before courts or tribunals. Since then, their content has 
remained largely unchanged despite further reform of Australian MHAs in the last 10 years. 
Western Australia made minor changes, adding disorders of ‘volition’ and ‘orientation’, in 
2014.88 
 
How, then should the meaning of the terms on these lists be interpreted? Broad 
(‘economical’) terms are employed, such as thought, mood, and perception, that are bound to 
present difficulties in application, given the infinite varieties of psychological life and the 
need to consider a person’s mental life as a whole. More detailed and extensive descriptions 
of abnormal mental states are provided in standard psychiatric texts on clinical 
psychopathology. What falls under the general concept of ‘thought disorder’, for instance, 
used in many Australian statutes? Does that concept cover only disorders of thought form or 
process, along with delusions, not other disorders of thought content? Many specific forms of 
thought disturbance are described in psychiatric texts, often alongside disturbances in 
language or speech considered to evidence disturbed thought.89 Which of these falls under the 
general concept of ‘thought disorder’ in the statute? 
 
A particular difficulty is that some concepts on the lists, such as disorders of ‘cognition’ and 
‘volition’, do not seem to be current psychiatric terms of art. Instead, they are broader 
psychological or philosophical concepts. How should they be interpreted? Disorder of 
volition is used as a heading in some older psychiatric texts, particularly from the early 
 
87 The NSW Act softens this approach somewhat by authorising the emergency admission of 
an additional class of ‘mentally disordered’ persons, whose ‘behaviour is said to be ‘so 
irrational as to justify their ‘temporary’ control. But their control can last only about 2 weeks: 
MHA 2007 (NSW), s 15. 
88 Mental Health Act 2014 (WA), s 6(1)(a). 
89 P Mullen, ‘The mental state and states of mind’, in R Murray, K Kendler, P McGuffin, S 
Wessely and D Castel (eds), Essential Psychiatry (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 
4th ed, 2008) 27. 
 23 
twentieth century,90 but not in many modern texts. Moreover, when used in modern texts, it 
generally refers only to ‘motor disorders’, or ‘pathological disturbances of action and 
movement’, such as ‘tics, catatonia, cataplexy and stupor’.91 This gives it a narrow compass. 
Perhaps ‘volition’ is used in the statute in some wider sense, that could take it far beyond 
motor disorders, even to disorders of self-control, or the ‘irresistible impulse’, bringing serial 
or sexual offending within the ambit of the Act. The exclusionary rules warn strongly against 
that conclusion. But what exactly does ‘disorder of volition’ mean in a MHA?  
 
Furthermore, even terms on the lists that could be considered psychiatric terms of art – such 
as disorders of ‘mood’, and ‘perception’, and ‘delusions’ – could generate disputes between 
psychiatrists. In one New Zealand case,92 the psychiatric witnesses disagreed on whether 
‘delusions’ – in the statute – covered the related notion of ‘over-valued ideas’.93  
 
A mismatch can also arise between the terms used to describe disorders of mental function in 
the statute and the language of the psychiatric manuals. Some core symptoms of anorexia 
nervosa, for instance, are described in DSM-5 as: ‘Restriction of energy intake relative to 
requirements, leading to a significantly low body weight’; ‘Intense fear of gaining weight or 
of becoming fat’; and ‘Disturbance in the way in which one’s body weight or shape is 
experienced’.94 None of those symptoms matches precisely the terms used on the 
Australasian lists, yet, when at imminent risk of death, some people diagnosed with anorexia 
are placed under the MHA.95  
 
90 K Jaspers, General Psychopathology (J Hoenig and M Hamilton trans., Manchester 
University Press: Manchester, 1963). 
91 For example, in P Mullen, ‘The mental state and states of mind’, in R Murray, K Kendler, 
P McGuffin, S Wessely and D Castel (eds), Essential Psychiatry (Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge, 4th ed, 2008) 29. 
92 Re RCH [2002] NZ Family Law Reports 413, para 33 (NZMHRT). 
93 The New Oxford Textbook of Psychiatry, M Gelder, N Andreasen, J Lopez-Ibor, J Geddes 
(eds), (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2nd edn, 2009) 50, 52, says an ‘over-valued idea’ is 
‘an acceptable, comprehensible idea pursued beyond the bounds of reason’; and ‘In 
overvalued ideas, the imagined interpretation surpasses other interpretations in strength; in 
delusions, all other possibilities are excluded’. Both are listed under ‘disorders of thinking’ in 
this text. 
94 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (American 
Psychiatric Association: Arlington, Virginia, 2013), 307.1. 
95 B McSherry, ‘Force-feeding and anorexia’ (1997) 5 Journal of Law and Medicine 8; Re 
FAH [1999] NZ Family Law Reports 615 (NZMHRT); P Beaumont and T Carney, ‘Can 
psychiatric terminology be translated into legal regulation? The anorexia nervosa example’, 
(2004) 38 ANZ J Psych 819. 
 24 
 
The big question then, is how to interpret and apply the meaning of the terms on these lists. 
Can an approach be found that will constrain and clarify their meaning, sufficiently, while 
leaving open the possibility that people said to have a personality disorder might be covered, 
in exceptional cases?  
 
A. Psychiatric and Legal Approaches to Interpretation of the Terms on the List 
Courts and tribunals have the authority to specify the proper interpretive approach. Two main 
approaches are likely to appeal to them: one stressing the use, in the list, of technical terms 
drawn from the discipline of psychiatry, the other stressing that these terms are used in the 
special context of the MHA. These could be called, respectively, the psychiatric and the legal 
approaches to interpretation. Can they achieve the required result? 
 
The psychiatric approach would rely heavily on specialist medical opinion. It would consider 
the terms on the list to have technical meanings drawn from the discipline of psychiatry, 
especially those – such as delusions, and disorders of mood, perception, memory and 
orientation – that can be considered psychiatric terms of art. This approach could constrain 
the meaning of all terms on the list. Although these terms are found in the statute, the details 
of their meaning would still be drawn from the textbooks of psychiatry. Moreover, the tenor 
of the list could be understood in terms of the philosophy of psychiatry that Lewis describes. 
Psychiatrists schooled in that tradition would understand, from the way the list is constructed, 
that it is intended to describe the disorders of mental function considered by their profession 
to characterise the so-called ‘psychoses’, or serious mental illness. That understanding could 
colour even the meaning of less specialised terms on the list, constraining the scope of 
disorders of ‘thought’, ‘cognition’, and ‘volition’. 
 
The legal approach, in contrast, would stress the statutory character of the list. This list is 
found, after all, in an Act of Parliament. Its terms may be chapter headings in texts on clinical 
psychopathology, and have particular meaning for psychiatrists. But now they are used in the 
MHA, to define situations in which people can be subject to compulsory powers. Read in this 
light, a court or tribunal might proceed to fix their meaning through standard judicial 
techniques of statutory interpretation. Those techniques might lead a court to emphasize the 
apparent purposes and functions of the Act, the scope of the powers conferred, and the impact 
on rights. In addition, a court might stress the broad nature of the audience to which the MHA 
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is addressed. After all, it is not just addressed to psychiatrists, but to judges, tribunal 
members, the Police, staff of prisons, family members, and especially to people who might be 
(or are already) subject to its powers. It is addressed to all engaged with the compulsory 
treatment process.  
 
That approach might lead a court or tribunal to say that the terms on the list should be given 
some ‘ordinary’ or ‘lay’ meaning that all these parties can understand,96 producing subtly 
different meanings for these terms than they would usually be given by psychiatrists. This is 
one possibility under the Australasian approach: that the terms on the list, having been 
transported from psychiatry to the law, will be given some new ‘legal’ meaning by courts and 
tribunals, opening a gap between psychiatry and the law.  
 
 
96 This approach was taken by Lawton L J in W v L [1974] QB 711. 
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B. A Resolution of the Interpretive Problem 
How should this potential conflict between interpretive approaches be resolved? Both 
approaches seem plausible. In effect, each stresses the role played by different participants in 
the process, particularly the role of psychiatrists and review bodies, who have concurrent 
powers to release patients from the Act. Perhaps, therefore, the resolution lies in some 
combination of the two approaches. The psychiatric approach to interpretation might usually 
prevail, but a more legalistic approach in exceptional cases.  
 
Under the usual psychiatric approach, the more specialised terms on the list would be given 
the meanings they have for psychiatrists, while the meaning of the less specialised terms 
would be coloured by the focus of the list on the features of mental illness, not personality 
disorder. The courts should have little difficulty endorsing that general approach. When the 
courts study the full structure of decision-making under the MHA, they will see that 
Parliament has deliberately conferred central roles on psychiatrists, especially roles in 
‘sectioning’ patients, and deciding on their immediate release. Parliament would hardly give 
psychiatrists those functions if it did not intend them to rely on their disciplinary expertise. 
Through such reasoning, the courts can conclude that a psychiatric approach to interpretation 
is the norm. 
 
On exceptional occasions, however, an approach that gives the terms on the list more distinct 
‘legal’ meanings might prevail, particularly the less specialised and more indeterminate items 
on the list. Here significant emphasis might be given to Parliament’s other purposes in 
passing the MHA, purposes such as: ensuring adequate access to assessment and observation 
in emergencies; ensuring people’s safety; and relieving intolerable stress on the police, courts 
and prison service. In such situations, some of the terms on the list might carry slightly wider 
meanings perhaps than they would carry for psychiatrists. The meaning of disorder of 
‘thought’ or ‘cognition’ might then go beyond disorder of thought form or process, and 
beyond delusions, to cover grossly disordered thought content, even if psychiatrists might not 
consider that a disorder of ‘part-function of the mind’. Such an interpretation might be 
reached, perhaps, when compelling justifications exist for a person’s control that seem fully 
consistent with Parliament’s purposes in passing the MHA. Perhaps, even, in such 
circumstances, psychiatrists should be prepared to adjust somewhat the meaning they give to 
such terms, recognising that, in exercising their authority under the Act, they are performing 
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specific social functions, conferred by law, altering the context in which interpretation takes 
place. 
 
C. The Adoption of this Approach in New Zealand 
Interpretation of the list in New Zealand reveals this kind of approach. It can be seen in the 
decisions of courts and tribunals, and in the official Guidelines (or Code of Practice) to the 
MHA issued by the Ministry of Health under the authority of the Act.97  
 
Regarding judicial interpretation, New Zealand’s courts and Mental Health Review Tribunal 
(MHRT) have consistently noted that the definition of mental disorder is a legal one, because 
it is included in the statute. Nevertheless, in the leading decision on the Act’s interpretation, 
Waitemata Health, the New Zealand Court of Appeal declared that ‘application’ of the 
definition is still ‘heavily dependent on the assessment of clinicians’.98 In a similar vein, the 
long-time convenor of the MHRT has declared that ‘meaningful interpretation and 
understanding of the Act will draw heavily on the constructs and insights of modern 
psychiatry”.99 The definition, he says, ‘has detailed clinical content’.100 Plus the tribunal 
notes that it ‘contains its own clinical expertise insofar as that one of its members must 
always be a psychiatrist’, and, in reaching its decisions, it “will be assisted by the expertise of 
that psychiatrist”.101 Thus, says the tribunal, specialised terms, like “delusions” and disorder 
of “mood” and “perception” in the New Zealand Act, should be given:102 
 
a specialised meaning which has evolved over 200 years of psychiatric and 
psychological scholarship. These meanings cannot be cast aside and nor can 
psychiatrists be required to cast aside their own understanding of these terms because it 
might be inconvenient due to the circumstances … of a specific and unique case. 
 
 
97 Guidelines to the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 
(Ministry of Health: Wellington, 2012). 
98 Waitemata Health v A-G (2001) 21 FRNZ 216; [2001] NZFLR 1122 (NZCA), para 68. 
99 N Dunlop, ‘Compulsory psychiatric treatment and “mental disorder”’ [2006] NZ Law 
Journal 227. 
100 Ibid, 225. 
101 Re PJT [2009] NZMHRT 09/130, para 61. 
102 Re IM [2002] NZMHRT 57/00, para 68. 
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On the other hand, the Guidelines to the Act note that the concepts of disorder of cognition 
and volition are less well-defined clinically, and more open to interpretation.103 The 
Guidelines still give those concepts a narrow reading, saying disorder of cognition extends 
only to disorders of thought process, not thought content. It would therefore usually be 
‘inappropriate’, it is said, to define “cognition” as a thought rather than a process to include 
people with deviant but non-delusional thoughts in the scope of the Act’.104 Similarly, the 
Guidelines say the term disorder of volition mainly covers ‘absent or changed volition that 
occur in the context of a major mental illness’. So it covers: ‘catatonic excitement or 
withdrawal’; ‘depressive stupor’; ‘passivity phenomena’; ‘command hallucinations’; and 
‘amotivational syndrome in major psychosis’.105 ‘In general’, however, ‘conditions such as 
psychosexual disorders and anti-social personality disorder will not be considered’ covered, 
‘unless particularly severe or complicated by another condition’ on the list.106 As to anorexia 
nervosa, the Guidelines say: ‘disordered self-perception … in eating disorders’ can be 
considered a disorder of ‘cognition’.107 
 
So, through judicial decisions and official Guidelines, some consistency has emerged in 
interpretation of the terms on the list. New Zealand courts and tribunals generally give these 
terms the meanings they would have for psychiatrists, particularly those viewed as terms of 
art. The less-specialised terms generate more doubt, but even their meaning is constrained by 
the list’s focus on the symptoms of severe (or ‘psychotic’) mental illness, and by the force of 
the exclusionary rules.  
 
New Zealand courts still say that overly ‘technical’ interpretations of the terms should be 
avoided, and that the terms’ meaning can expand or contract somewhat, based on the strength 
of the justifications for an individual’s control under the Act. In one exceptional case, where 
a man posed very serious threats of harm to identifiable women, the Court of Appeal held 
 
103 Guidelines to the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 
(Ministry of Health: Wellington, 2012) 5. 
104 Ibid 7. 
105 Ibid 6. 
106 Ibid 7. 
107 Idem. 
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that ‘a severe personality disorder that led to an exceptionally disturbed view of the world 
could feasibly be taken to be a disorder of cognition or perception’.108  
 
This suggests that a balance can be struck between respecting the ethics and practices of the 
psychiatric profession and giving effect to Parliament’s intentions in passing the Act. 
 
D. The Outcome for Personality Disorder 
Richard Mullen, an experienced New Zealand psychiatrist, has described, in an essay, the 
outcome for personality disorder.109 He concludes it is generally ‘a hard push to find 
particular abnormalities in the mental state of a person with personality disorder that fit the 
characteristics’ described in New Zealand’s definition.110 This is because ‘personality 
disturbance is generally manifest in behaviour and relationships. So its identification rests 
more on interpersonal interactions that isolating specific mental phenomena’.111 Nevertheless, 
he says some people said to have a personality disorder may be covered on specific 
occasions, though often for short periods only. They might exhibit a disorder of mood of the 
necessary quality. The notion of disorder of ‘volition might be invoked’, he says, regarding 
‘those disturbances of behaviour, such as self-harm, that are often associated with personality 
disorder’.112 ‘Over-valued ideas’ might occasionally be conflated with ‘delusions’ under the 
Act, and, although he thinks the notion of disorder of cognition ‘is intended to be interpreted 
fairly narrowly’, so as not cover ‘thoughts that might simply be considered socially 
unacceptable’, he considers the MHRT has occasionally ‘felt it necessary to stretch this 
notion, to include, for example, severely disordered personality with sexual sadism’.113  
 
The upshot, Mullen says, is that ‘Compulsory treatment is commonly used in New Zealand 
for people with personality disorder in crisis situations’, and inpatient orders may be used, 
 
108 This is how the decision in Waitemata Health v A-G (2001) 21 Family Reports NZ 216; 
[2001] NZ Family Law Reports 1122 (NZCA) is summarised in the Guidelines to the Mental 
Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 (Ministry of Health: Wellington, 
2012). 
109 R Mullen, ‘Personality disorder and the Mental Health Act’, in J Dawson and K Gledhill 
(eds), New Zealand’s Mental Health Act in Practice (Victoria University Press: Wellington, 
2013), 46. 
110 Ibid, 49. 
111 Idem. 
112 Ibid, 50. 
113 Ibid, 51. 
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though ‘usually only for few days’.114 He concludes with a warning, reminiscent of Lewis, 
that:115 
 
Psychiatrists need to be wary of policing deviance. If we draw the line, when 
determining use of the Act, that corresponds too closely to societal wishes, that would 
constitute tacit agreement that mental disorder should be determined by society, not by 
those with professional expertise. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
How, then, should we evaluate this Australasian approach? Obviously, there is no perfect 
way to define mental disorder or mental illness in a MHA. Nor can any such definition avoid 
the need for further interpretation, or the need for psychiatrists to draw upon their disciplinary 
expertise. The ‘determining principle’, as to the mental element in the standards, must 
therefore be established, at least in part, by implication. It is not fully accessible from the text 
of the Act.  
 
Perhaps, in future, no definition of the mental element in the standards governing compulsion 
will be needed in a MHA. Compulsory psychiatric treatment may no longer be necessary, or 
MHAs may be abolished,116 or legislation authorising compulsory treatment may be based on 
some other standard, such as a general test of incapacity to consent to treatment, regardless of 
the cause.117 This may render the need for such a definition obsolete. At present, with at least 
70 MHAs in operation, in the UK, USA, Canada, and Australasia alone, it seems likely that 
MHAs will continue to be a feature of medical law for some time, that they will include a 
mental element in their standards, and that this element will periodically come up for reform. 
If so, will the Australasian approach be a worthy model? 
 
The best way to judge this approach is probably against its own apparent assumptions, 
outlined at the start of this article. Providing a statutory list of disorders of mental function 
 
114 Ibid, 58. 
115 Ibid, 59. 
116 As recommended by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, in its General Comment No 1 (2014): Article 12: Equal Recognition Before the 
Law, CRPD/C/GC/1, 19 May 2014. 
117 J Dawson and G Szmukler, ‘The fusion of mental health and incapacity legislation’ (2006) 
188 Br J Psych 504. 
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has the advantage of giving some specific content to the definition. The list’s terms will still 
require interpretation, but its contents can be viewed, in total, as more than the sum of its 
parts. To those schooled in the particular psychiatric tradition, described by Lewis, that has 
been so influential in the English-speaking world, the way the definition is constructed will 
reveal the general intention to limit its cover to disorders of ‘part-function of the mind’ of the 
kind that characterise mental illness. In addition, the exclusionary rules warn strongly against 
inferring mental disorder from disturbed behaviour alone.  
 
This interpretation imposes certain constraints on the meaning of the terms employed, and 
this in turn makes it ‘a hard push’ to fit the characteristics of personality disorder within the 
terms on the list. People said to have a personality disorder but not a mental illness are not 
excluded, in such terms, from cover by the Act, but the conclusion that they are covered cuts 
against the grain of the definition, and will not be lightly reached. A compelling justification 
is required to bring a person described in that way under the Act, which seems a sensible 
approach.  
 
Precedents as to proper interpretation can be set by courts and tribunals, and authoritative 
Guidelines on the matter can be issued under the authority of the Act. In the result, an 
interpretation can be established that gives reasonably determinate meaning to the terms on 
the list.  
 
Ultimately, the greatest contribution that the Australasian approach might make is in 
rendering decisions about the use of compulsory powers ‘more susceptible to critical 
examination and arbitration’ (as the DHSS committee put it, in 1976). It does this by defining 
the mental element in terms that are ‘readily understood by clinicians’, but still permit ‘close 
monitoring and debate on individual decisions’.118 This effect of this may be especially 
significant in proceedings before review tribunals. The definition adopted in the Australasian 
statutes should encourage tribunals to insist that psychiatrists, in their reports and evidence, 
particularise, in the relevant terms, the disorders of mental function the person presents. The 
tribunal should require the clinician to describe the links (or nexus) between those disorders 
and the risks or dangers of concern. It should insist on being convinced that the person’s 
control is not based on disturbed behaviour alone, and it should seek an explanation of why 
 
118 Department of Health and Social Security, A Review of the Mental Health Act 1959 
(HMSO: London, 1976), Appendix II. 
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the features of the person’s mental state require authority over their treatment to be 
transferred to others. That approach should help clarify the role of the review body vis-à-vis 
the responsible clinician, and facilitate questioning of that clinician by a lawyer for the 
patient.  It does this mainly by giving priority to the particular over the general in description 
of mental states. In this fashion, the Australasian approach might contribute something to rule 
of law values, and diminish somewhat the chances of arbitrary detention.  
 
This would explain why the Australasian legislatures adopted their approach to the definition 
of the mental element at the same time as they granted compulsory patients greater review 
entitlements. In conducting a review of a compulsory patient’s status, a court or tribunal 
should be satisfied that every element of the legal criteria is met. For that purpose, a 
definition based on a list of specific disorders of mental function may be better than no 
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